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The existence of an undetectable eavesdropping of dense coded information has been already
demonstrated by Pavicˇic´ for the quantum direct communication based on the ping-pong paradigm.
However, a) the explicit scheme of the circuit is only given and no design rules are provided, b) the
existence of losses is implicitly assumed, c) the attack has been formulated against qubit based
protocol only and it is not clear whether it can be adapted to higher dimensional systems. These
deficiencies are removed in the presented contribution.
A new generic eavesdropping scheme built on a firm theoretical background is proposed. In
contrast to the previous approach, it does not refer to the properties of the vacuum state, so it
is fully consistent with the absence of losses assumption. Moreover, the scheme applies to the
communication paradigm based on signal particles of any dimensionality. It is also shown that some
well known attacks are special cases of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum direct communication (QDC) aims at provision of confidentiality without resorting to classic encryption.
This is in contrast to quantum key distribution (QKD) technique, as no shared key is established and quantum
resources take over its role. In QDC, similarly to QKD, its is assumed that legitimate parties can communicate over
open and authenticated classic channel.
The roots of QDC can be traced out to the QKD protocol of Long and Liu [1] that, after slight modification
proposed as the two-step protocol [2], can be considered the first protocol of this kind. The ping-pong protocol [3]
is another QDC scheme which is easier to implement at the price of lesser security margin and capacity. These
initial works exploited the entanglement of EPR pairs to protect transmission of sensitive information. Ideas of these
proposals have been further adapted to higher dimensional systems [4–7] and/or modified to enhance capacity via
dense coding [8, 9]. The entanglement is a very fragile quantum resource and its handling is technically challenging.
This motivated the work towards exploiting quantum uncertainty, a resource used by most QKD protocols. The first
single-photon QDC protocol proposed by Deng and Long [10] has been recently demonstrated experimentally [11].
The LM05 protocol [12] is the other worth noting proposal of this kind. The history of the development and the
review of the early QDC proposals can be found in [13].
QDC protocols offer different level of security which usually results from the trade off between practical feasibility
and type of quantum resources available to communicating parties. QDC protocols which process particles in blocks [2,
4] can be parametrized in such a way that probability of revealing sensitive information is arbitrarily small. However,
they assume that legitimate parties have long term quantum memory. Protocols that process particles individually are
quasi secure [13–15]. Quasi security means, that before eavesdropping detection, which is inevitable for long sequences,
part of the sensitive information may be revealed to the eavesdropper. QDC is a more versatile cryptographic primitive
than QKD. In fact, QDC protocols can be used as engines for key agreement. Any key agreement protocol executed in
a private channel provided by a QDC protocol offering unconditional security has security comparable with QKD. Also
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2quasi secure QDC protocols can realize unconditionally secure QKD. However, in this case QDC phase delivers shared
sequence that is partially known to the eavesdropper. By the appropriate postprocessing i.e., privacy amplification,
the eavesdropper’s knowledge on the resulting sequence can be reduced to arbitrary small value provided that his
information on the initial sequence is less that mutual information of the legitimate parties. The realization of the
QKD via QDC can be potentially more efficient as the basis reconciliation step, that severely plaques efficiency of
many QKD protocols, can be avoided [16–18]. Protocols of this type are referred as deterministic QKD and some of
them have been recently experimentally demonstrated [19, 20].
This paper is devoted to the analysis of the (in)security of the ping-pong protocol – an entanglement based QDC
scheme [3]. Quasi security is provided only for perfect quantum channels [14] and the scheme becomes insecure
when losses [21] and/or communication errors and imperfection of devices are taken into account [22]. Protocol
offers capacity of single bit per protocol cycle because the authenticity of the shared EPR pair is verified only by a
measurement in a single basis. This limits the available encoding to phase flips. Possible capacity enhancement via
dense coding leads to undetectable information leakage as demonstrated in [2] and usage of mutually unbiased bases
in control measurements is required to preserve quasi security of the communication [8]. In our previous work we
have proved that this observation also holds for the qudit based protocol and that detection probability depends on
the number of bases used in the control mode [7, 23]. Anyway, no explicit attack transformation has been given in
the aforementioned papers. The present contribution is motivated by the appearance of the circuit [24] (further it
will be referred as P-circuit) capable to undetectable intercept information transmitted in the qubit based ping-pong
protocol with the following configuration: quantum channel is perfect, legitimate parties use single basis for control
measurements, information is dense coded. In other words – the instantiation of the attack forecast in [2]. Although
P-circuit is applicable to perfect channels, it assumes the appearance of the vacuum states in the eavesdropper’s
ancilla. In consequence, it does not well fit to the existing analyses. Shortly after its appearance, a control mode that
address detection of this specific circuit has been proposed [25].
We propose a generic scheme for construction of attacks that permit undetectable eavesdropping under the same
assumptions: quantum channel is perfect, control measurements are executed in a single basis, sensitive information is
dense coded. Thus our contribution can be considered as the generalization of the result given in [24]. The presented
method is applicable to systems of any dimension so it can be used to construct a plethora of new transforms. Using
introduced generalization we also demonstrate the equivalence of the attack from [24] and CNOT operation. In
consequence, we claim that there is no need for construction of specific control modes as in [25], because any control
mode able to detect CNOT operation is also able to detect circuit proposed in [24]. We do not propose the attack
that is undetectable by control measurements in unbiased bases. In fact, we think that the opposite is true – control
measurements in mutually unbiased bases are sufficient to statistically detect coherence break of the shared entangled
state and, that way, reveal the presence of the eavesdropper [23].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide notation and concepts used in the text. Section 3 presents
the main contribution. In particular we provide a general bit-flip detection scheme, demonstrate its equivalence with
the existing approaches and introduce an attack on the qudit-based protocol. In Section 4 we summarize the presented
work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Ping-Pong protocol
Communication protocol described below is a ping-pong paradigm variant analysed in [24]. Compared to the
seminal version [3], it differs only on the encoding operation – the sender uses dense coding instead of phase flips.
The remaining elements of the communication scenario are left intact.
Bob starts the communication process by creation of EPR pair[28]
|Ψinit〉 = |Ψ−〉 = (|0h〉|1t〉 − |1h〉|0t〉) /
√
2. (1)
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FIG. 1. The schematic diagram of a message mode in the ping-pong protocol.
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FIG. 2. The schematic diagram of a control mode in the ping-pong protocol.
Then he sends one of the qubits, further referred to as the signal/travel qubit, to Alice. Alice can in principle encode
two classic bits µ, ν applying unitary transformation Aµ,ν = X µZν where X = |1〉〈0| + |0〉〈1|, Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|
are bit-flip and phase-flip operations, respectively. The signal particle is sent back to Bob, who detects applied
transformation by a collective measurement of both qubits (FIG. 1).
Passive eavesdropping is impossible. Eve has access only to the travel qubit which before and after encoding looks
like maximally mixed state. Unfortunately, the described communication scenario is vulnerable to the intercept-resend
attack and Alice have to check whether the received qubit is genuine. As a countermeasure, Alice measures the received
qubit in computational basis (|0〉, |1〉) in randomly selected protocol cycles and asks Bob over authenticated classic
channel to do the same with his qubit (FIG. 2). Her measurement causes the collapse of the shared state (1). The
perfect (anti)correlation of the outcomes is preserved only if the qubit measured by Alice is the same one that was sent
by Bob. If Eve inserts fake qubit then measured qubits are no longer correlated and some discrepancies, that are the
sign of the eavesdropping, do occur. That way Alice and Bob can convince themselves with confidence approaching
certainty that the quantum channel is not spoofed, provided that they have executed a sufficient number of control
cycles.
However, the intercept-resend attack is not the only possible way of active sensitive information interception. The
signal particle that travels forth and back between legitimate parties can be the subject of any quantum action
introduced by Eve (FIG. 3). Introduced coupling causes that encoding operation also modifies Eve’s ancilla state and
Eve hopes to detect decipher Alice’s actions by its inspection. Actions of Eve, not necessarily unitary in the affected
qubit’s space, can be described as unitary operation Q acting in the space extended with two additional qubits, as
follows from Stinespring’s dilation theorem. The control state shared by legitimate parties then takes the form
|ψhtE〉 = (Ih ⊗Q) (|Ψinit〉 ⊗ |χE〉) (2)
where |χE〉 is some initial state of Eve’s ancilla. Eve presence is detected with probability
pdet(Q) = Tr (Pht TrE (|ψhtE〉〈ψhtE |)) (3)
where projection Pht depends on initial state and the considered case it is defined as
Pht = Iht − |0h〉〈0h| ⊗ |1t〉〈1t| − |1h〉〈1h| ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|. (4)
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FIG. 3. A schematic diagram of an individual attack.
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FIG. 4. P-circuit Qtxy [24, eq. (2)].
B. Pavicˇic´ attack
Pavicˇic´’s attack demonstrates the violation of ping-pong protocol security when dense coding is used. The attack
does not introduce errors nor losses in control and message mode and it permits eavesdropping information encoded
as bit flip operation.
The P-circuit presented by Pavicˇic´ (FIG. 4) is a result of a cut and try procedure [24, section IV] applied to
the Wo´jcik’s circuit [21]. It is is composed of two Hadamard gates followed by the controlled polarization beam
splitter (CPBS), which is a generalization of the polarization beam splitter (PBS) concept. The PBS is a two port
gate that swaps horizontally polarized photons |0x〉 (|0y〉) entering its input to the other port |0y〉 (|0x〉) on output
while vertically polarized ones |1x〉 (|1y〉) retain in their port |1x〉 (|1y〉) i.e.:
PBS|vx〉|0y〉 = |0x〉|vy〉, PBS|vx〉|1y〉 = |vx〉|1y〉, (5a)
PBS|0x〉|vy〉 = |vx〉|0y〉, PBS|1x〉|vy〉 = |1x〉|vy〉, (5b)
where |v〉 denotes the vacuum state. The CPBS behaves as normal PBS if control qubit is set to |0t〉. The roles of
horizontal and vertical polarization are exchanged for control qubit set to |1t〉:
CPBS|0t〉|vx〉|0y〉 = |0t〉|0x〉|vy〉, CPBS|1t〉|vx〉|0y〉 = |1t〉|vx〉|0y〉, (6a)
CPBS|0t〉|0x〉|vy〉 = |0t〉|vx〉|0y〉, CPBS|1t〉|0x〉|vy〉 = |1t〉|0x〉|vy〉, (6b)
CPBS|0t〉|vx〉|1y〉 = |0t〉|vx〉|1y〉, CPBS|1t〉|vx〉|1y〉 = |1t〉|1x〉|vy〉, (6c)
CPBS|0t〉|1x〉|vy〉 = |0t〉|1x〉|vy〉, CPBS|1t〉|1x〉|vy〉 = |1t〉|vx〉|1y〉. (6d)
Initially Eve’s ancilla is initialized to the state |χ0〉 = |vx〉|0y〉. The action of the P-circuit from FIG. 4 is then
described by the following formulas
Qtxy|0t〉|χ0〉 = 1√
2
|0t〉 (|0x〉|vy〉+ |vx〉|1y〉) = |0t〉|aE〉, (7a)
Qtxy|1t〉|χ0〉 = 1√
2
|1t〉 (|vx〉|0y〉+ |1x〉|vy〉) = |1t〉|dE〉. (7b)
5For the purpose of future analysis, let us also identify actions of the circuit under consideration onto the state
|χ1〉 = |0x〉|vy〉:
Qtxy|0t〉|χ1〉 = 1√
2
|0t〉 (|vx〉|0y〉+ |1x〉|vy〉) = |0t〉|dE〉, (8a)
Qtxy|1t〉|χ1〉 = 1√
2
|1t〉 (|0x〉|vy〉+ |vx〉|1y〉) = |1t〉|aE〉. (8b)
The control state (2) after entangling with Eve’s ancilla reads
|ψhtE〉 = (|0h〉|1t〉|dE〉+ |1h〉|0t〉|aE〉) /
√
2. (9)
This state is further used by Alice and Bob for eavesdropping check. It is clear from (3) that attack does not introduce
errors nor losses in control mode and the expected correlation of outcomes is preserved in the computational basis.
Phase flip.: The phase flip encoding applied to the coupled state leads to
|ψphase〉 = (Ih ⊗Zt)|ψhtE〉 = 1√
2
(|1h〉|0t〉|aE〉 − |0h〉|1t〉|dE〉) . (10)
The signal qubit is then sent back to Bob who, after disentangling on a basis of (7), observes
|φphase〉 = (Qtxy)−1|ψphase〉 = 1√
2
(|1h〉|0t〉 − |0h〉|1t〉) |vx〉|0y〉 = [(Ih ⊗Zt) |ψinit〉] |χ0〉. (11)
Bit flip.: The bit flip operation transforms Alice’s state to
|ψbit〉 = (Ih ⊗Xt)|ψhtE〉 = 1√
2
(|1h〉|1t〉|aE〉+ |0h〉|0t〉|dE〉) . (12)
The system state after disentangling can be deduced from (8):
|φbit〉 = (Qtxy)−1|ψbit〉 = 1√
2
(|1h〉|1t〉+ |0h〉|0t〉) |0x〉|vy〉 = [(Ih ⊗Xt) |ψinit〉] |χ1〉. (13)
In both cases i.e., phase flip and bit flip encodings, the signalling subsystem behaves as if there was no coupling with
the ancilla. However, Alice’s bit flip encoding modifies Eve’s register (|χ0〉 → |χ1〉). The states |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 are
orthogonal and perfectly distinguishable. In consequence Eve can eavesdrop bit flip operations without introducing
errors and losses in message mode as well.
III. RESULTS
This section is devoted to the analysis of the general form of the incoherent attack shown diagrammatically in FIG. 3.
Each cycle of the protocol is considered to be independent on the other ones. Consequently, the effectiveness of the
attack is expressed in a fraction of eavesdropped bits per communication cycle. Throughout the analysis it is also
assumed that legitimate parties rely on control mode used in the seminal version of the protocol. They locally
measure possessed particles in the computational basis and verify expected correlation via the public discussion over
authenticated classic channel.
A. Generic bit-flip detection scheme for qubit based protocol
As the control mode explores outcomes of local measurements in computational basis for intrusion detection, the
map Q has to be of trivial form
Q|0t〉|χE〉 → |0t〉|aE〉, Q|1t〉|χE〉 → |1t〉|dE〉 (14)
6to not induce errors and/or losses in control cycles. It follows, that under attack, Alice operates on the state
|ψhtE〉 = 1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉|dE〉 − |1h〉|0t〉|aE〉) . (15)
Let the entangling transformation Q additionally satisfies
Q|0t〉|φE〉 → |0t〉|dE〉, Q|1t〉|φE〉 → |1t〉|aE〉 (16)
for some state |φE〉 6= |χE〉. The process of information encoding and disentangling from the ancilla is then described
by the expressions:
Q−1 (Ih ⊗ It ⊗ IE) |ψhtE〉 = Q−1 1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉|dE〉 − |1h〉|0t〉|aE〉) =
=
1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉|χE〉 − |1h〉|0t〉|χE〉) = |Ψ−〉|χE〉 , (17a)
Q−1 (Ih ⊗Xt ⊗ IE) |ψhtE〉 = Q−1 1√
2
(|0h〉|0t〉|dE〉 − |1h〉|1t〉|aE〉) =
=
1√
2
(|0h〉|0t〉|φE〉 − |1h〉|1t〉|φE〉) = |Φ−〉|φE〉 , (17b)
Q−1 (Ih ⊗Zt ⊗ IE) |ψhtE〉 = Q−1−1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉|dE〉+ |1h〉|0t〉|aE〉) =
=
−1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉|χE〉+ |1h〉|0t〉|χE〉) = −|Ψ+〉|χE〉 , (17c)
Q−1 (Ih ⊗XtZt ⊗ IE) |ψhtE〉 = Q−1−1√
2
(|0h〉|0t〉|dE〉+ |1h〉|1t〉|aE〉) =
=
−1√
2
(|0h〉|0t〉|φE〉+ |1h〉|1t〉|φE〉) = −|Φ+〉|φE〉 . (17d)
As a result, the registers used for signalling are left untouched and decoupled but the Eve’s register is flipped from
|χE〉 to |φE〉 when Alice applies bit-flip operation. In consequence, Eve can successfully decode a half of the message
content provided that the detection states |χE〉, |φE〉 are perfectly distinguishable. It follows that any unitary coupling
transformation Q that satisfies (14) and (16) can be used for bit flip detection.
B. Equivalence of P and CNOT circuits
The properties of the above generic scheme and the P-circuit [24] perfectly coincide. As follows from (7) and (8),
the states |χ0〉 = |vx〉|0y〉 and |χ1〉 = |0x〉|vy〉 play the role of detection states |χE〉 and |φE〉, respectively. It is also
clear that transformation Qtxy has properties claimed in (14) and (16). Thus the P-circuit can be considered as an
instance of the generic scheme described in section III A.
However, the operator Q satisfying (14) and (16) can be realized in many ways. It seems that CNOT operation
acting on a single qubit of Eve’s ancilla: Q = CNOTtx, |χE〉 = |0x〉, |φE〉 = |1x〉, |aE〉 = |0x〉, |dE〉 = |1x〉 is the
simplest realization of the logic behind the attack. Such version is also practically feasible as the attacks involving
probes entangled via the CNOT operation have been already proposed in the QKD context [26, 27]. As a result, both,
the CNOT and P circuits are equivalent in terms of provided information gain, detectability and practical feasibility.
Consequently, there is no need for the design of control modes that address P-circuit in a special manner [25].
7C. An attack on qudit based protocol
The P-circuit has no straightforward generalization to qudit based version of the protocol. In contrast, the presented
approach can be adapted with ease. Let Bob start communication process with creation of EPR pair
|β(0,0)h,t 〉 =
1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
|kh〉|kt〉 , (18)
where D is the qudit dimension. The travel qudit is then sent to Alice for encoding or control measurement. In
control mode, the home and travel qubits are measured in the computational basis so the projection Pht used in
control equation (3) takes the form
Pht = Iht −
D−1∑
k=0
|kh〉〈kh| ⊗ |kt〉〈kt| (19)
Let, by an analogy to the qubit case, |α(k)E 〉 and |a(k)E 〉 be the sets of D orthonormal states of the ancilla system. These
states will be further referred to as detection and probe states, respectively. The map used by Eve must be of the
form
Q|kt〉|α(0)E 〉 → |kt〉|a(k)E 〉, k = 0, . . . , D − 1 (20)
to not introduce errors in control measurements. Let us additionally postulate that Q satisfies
Q|kt〉|α(m)E 〉 → |kt〉|a(m+k mod D)E 〉 (21)
i.e., Q advances index k positions in a set of Eve’s probe states. Similarly, Q−1 backwards index k positions:
Q−1|kt〉|a(m)E 〉 → |kt〉|α(m−k mod D)E 〉. (22)
Let us recall that for qudits Alice uses
Z =
D−1∑
k=0
ωk|k〉〈k|, X =
D−1∑
k=0
|k + 1 mod D〉〈k|, ω = ej2pi/D (23)
to encode classic µ, ν “cdits” in the following way
|β(µ,ν)h,t 〉 = X µt Zνt |β(0,0)h,t 〉 =
1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
ωkν |kh〉|(k + µ mod D)t〉 (24)
Under attack Alice applies encoding (24) to the state coupled according to the rule (20)
|ψenc〉 = X µt Zνt Q|β(0,0)h,t 〉|α(0)E 〉 = X µt Zνt
1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
|kh〉|kt〉|a(k)E 〉 =
1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
ωkν |kh〉|(k + µ mod D)t〉|a(k)E 〉 (25)
The travel qubit is affected by Q−1 in its way back to Bob
|φdec〉 = Q−1|ψenc〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
ωkν |kh〉
(
Q−1|(k + µ mod D)t〉|a(k)E 〉
)
=
=
{
1√
D
D−1∑
k=0
ωkν |kh〉|(k + µ mod D)t〉
}
|α(−µ mod D)E 〉 (26)
The expression in curly braces is an exactly the state that Bob expects to receive when there is no Eve (see (24)),
so eavesdropping also does not affect the message. At the same time, the initial state of the ancilla is moved µ
8positions within the set of detection states. As a result, Eve can unambiguously identify the value of cdit µ as long
as the detection states are mutually orthogonal.
The CX (Controlled X ) gate seems to be the simplest instance of the attack paradigm. Let the detection and probe
sets of states be the elements of the computational basis (|α(m)E 〉 = |mE〉, |a(m)E 〉 = |mE〉) and the ancilla is composed
of the single qudit register. The attack operation Q can be then implemented as
Q|kt〉|α(m)E 〉 = CX |kt〉|mE〉 = |kt〉X kE |mE〉 = |kt〉|(m+ k mod D)E〉 (27)
In obvious way the requirements (21) regarding properties of the Q are then fulfilled.
The existence of attacks able to undetectably eavesdrop half of the dense coded information has been already forecast
in relation to qubit [2], qutrit [6] and qudit [23] based protocol. However, no explicit form of the attack transformation
has been given. Presented result fills this gap in and provides some general guidelines how to construct a coupling
transformation with desired properties.
D. Control mode able to detect bit-flip eavesdropping
The insecurity of the considered protocol results from inability to detect couplingQht with the control measurements
in a single basis. Let us consider a qubit based protocol from section II A with control mode enhanced to measurements
in two bases – namely computational basis and its dual basis i.e., eigenvectors of X gate. In the new control mode,
Alice randomly selects measurement basis, performs measurement and asks Bob to make local measurement in the
same basis. The control state (9) in the absence of coupling takes the form
|ψhtE〉 = 1√
2
(|0h〉|1t〉+ |1h〉|0t〉) |χ0〉 = 1√
2
(|+h〉|+t〉 − |−h〉|−t〉) |χ0〉 (28)
where |±〉 = (|0〉±|1〉)/√2 are eigenvectors of X . It follows that legitimate parties expect anticorrelation (correlation)
of outcomes in the computational (dual) basis. Under attack undetectable in the computational basis (14), the control
equation (15) takes the following form in the dual basis
|ψhtE〉 = 1
2
√
2
{|+h〉 (|dE〉 − |aE〉) + |−h〉 (|dE〉+ |aE〉)} |+t〉− 1
2
√
2
{|+h〉 (|dE〉+ |aE〉) + |−h〉 (|dE〉 − |aE〉)} |−t〉.
(29)
Alice measurement causes the collapse to one of the states in the curly braces. It follows that Bob can obtain ±1
outcome with equal probability, what in turns renders Eve detectability. If control bases are selected with equal
probability then bit-flip attack is detected with pdet = 1/4. The above qualitative discussion addresses bit-flip attack.
The more advanced discussion on the properties of control modes based on mutually unbiased bases and in relation
to attacks of any form can be found in [23].
IV. CONCLUSION
A generic scheme that provides undetectable eavesdropping of bit-flip operations in the seminal version of the ping-
pong protocol is introduced. It can be considered as a generalization of the P-circuit [24], but in contrast, it is deduced
from the very basic properties of the coupling transformation. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be realized without
referring to the vacuum states so it is fully consistent with the absence of losses assumption. The CNOT gate and
P-circuit are special cases of the introduced scheme so both approaches are equivalent. It follows, that any control
mode able to detect CNOT coupling is also able to detect the presence of the P-circuit. The control mode based on
local measurements in randomly selected unbiased bases is an example of such procedure. Consequently, there is no
need of special addressing of P-circuit in the security analyses. Also, the introduced scheme can be adapted to higher
dimensional systems. It can be considered as the constructive proof of the existence of attacks forecast in [2, 6, 23].
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